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Abstract
We analyze a model where a multinational fir can use a superior technology in a
foreign subsidiary only after training a local worker. Technological spillovers from foreign
direct investment arise when this worker is later hired by a local firm Pecuniary spillovers
arise when the foreign affiliat pays the trained worker a higher wage to prevent her from
moving to a local competitor. We study conditions under which these spillovers occur. We
also show that the multinational fir might fin it optimal to export instead of investing
abroad to avoid dissipation of its intangible assets or the payment of a higher wage to the
trained worker.
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1. Introduction
The last two decades have witnessed an important change in the attitude of host
countries towards multinational enterprises (MNEs). Most countries have removed
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1their barriers to foreign direct investment (FDI) and have actively encouraged
investment by foreign firms Advocates of these policies claim that MNEs generate
spillovers which benefi the host economy. Such spillovers may take several
1 forms.
First, there may exist backward and forward linkages between foreign affiliate
and local firm (Lall, 1980; Rodriguez-Clare, 1996). Second, foreign affiliate may
increase local firms productivity through ‘‘demonstration effects’’. For example,
domestic competitors might successfully imitate technological innovations intro-
¨ duced by MNEs (Mansfiel and Romeo, 1980; Blomstrom, 1986). Third,
spillovers arise when subsidiaries of foreign firm train local employees who later
join local firm or set up their own companies, bringing with them all (or part of)
the technological, marketing, and managerial knowledge that they have acquired.
In this paper, we focus on this last form of spillovers, and we present a model in
which technological spillovers arise due to the mobility of workers who have been
trained by MNEs. Our main purpose is to study the conditions under which such
spillovers occur.
The fact that MNEs undertake substantial efforts in the education of local
workers has been documented in many instances (e.g., ILO, 1981; Lindsey, 1986),
and empirical research seems to indicate that MNEs offer more training to
technical workers and managers than do local firm (Chen, 1983; Gerschenberg,
1987). In early stages, affiliate rely more intensively on expatriates, but
subsequently they tend to replace them with (cheaper) local workers who have
been properly trained in the meanwhile (UNLTC, 1993).
However, evidence on spillovers due to workers’ mobility is scarce and far from
2 conclusive. An early study by Behrman and Wallender (1976) shows that, while
labor mobility is important in certain circumstances, it is minimal in others.
Gerschenberg (1987) analyzes MNEs’ activity in Kenya. He concludes that
mobility is lower for managers employed by MNEs than for those employed by
local firms In a study of the Taiwanese economy, Pack (1993) find that labor
mobility from MNEs to local firm is important and that often trained managers
leave MNEs to run their own businesses. Aitken et al. (1997) study the effect of
inward FDI on the wages of the local workforce in three different host countries.
In Mexico and Venezuela, inward FDI increases the wages of the workers in MNE
affiliates but has no effect on the wages of local firms workers. In the US, inward
FDI results in higher wages both in MNE affiliate and in local firms Indirectly,
this might show the existence of technological spillovers through labor mobility in
the US, whereas in Mexico and Venezuela such labor mobility might be inhibited
by either the higher wages paid by the MNEs or a larger technology gap.
Our paper provides a formalization which is consistent with these findings We
build a model where a MNE trains a local worker to run its subsidiary. Later, the
1 ¨ See Blomstrom and Kokko (1998) for an extensive review of FDI spillovers.
2 ¨ See also Blomstrom and Kokko (1998).
2MNE and a local fir compete for the services of the trained worker. As a result,
the MNE manages to keep the worker only if it offers better conditions than the
local firm Spillovers from foreign direct investment can take two forms.
Technological spillovers arise when the trained worker is hired by the local firm
Pecuniary spillovers arise when the MNE pays the worker a higher wage to
prevent her from moving to the local competitor.
We fin that the so-called ‘‘joint profit ’ effect (or ‘‘efficiency ’ effect) plays an
important role in determining which type of spillovers arises. We show that
technological spillovers do not occur if the joint profi of the MNE and the local
fir is highest when the MNE can use the technology as a monopolist. This result
is similar to that obtained in the literature on the persistence of monopolies (see
Tirole, 1988). The empirical implication is that one should expect higher labor
mobility and more spillovers (both technological and pecuniary) when the local
fir can use the technology in activities that do not compete fiercel with the
MNE. This occurs, for example, when the local fir can operate in markets for
products which are unrelated or complementary to the MNE’s products. Un-
fortunately, we are aware of no empirical studies which try to link the existence of
spillovers with the sectors of activity of multinational and local firms
We also fin that a low level of ‘‘absorptive capability’’ by the local firm which
might be due to technological backwardness, reduces the potential for FDI
generating spillovers. The empirical evidence seems to confir that spillovers
increase with the degree of absorptive capability of host country firm (see, for
instance, Kokko, 1994; Borensztein et al., 1998).
Further, the mobility of the trained workers is higher the more general is the
on-the-job training given by the MNE, which is consistent with the labor
economics literature (e.g., Becker, 1964). Our addition to this literature is to show
that it is not only the nature of the training (general versus specifi ), but also the
degree of product market competition which affects labor mobility.
Finally, the MNE might anticipate that investing abroad would lead either to
technological spillovers or to higher wages and choose to export instead.
Anecdotal evidence confirm that this may sometimes be the reason why MNEs
export. An illustrative example is drawn from the history of the chemical sector
(Kudo, 1993). After World War I, the leading German chemical company, IG
Farben, decided to increase its activity in the growing Japanese market, whose
chemical industry was still at an infant stage. IG Farben resorted to exporting and
avoided FDI (and licensing) as much as possible in order to minimize the diffusion
of technology to competitors.
Other game theoretical models have analyzed spillovers to foreign markets,
although from different perspectives. In Ethier and Markusen (1996), technologi-
cal spillovers arise as a result of a double moral hazard problem. A foreign fir
endowed with a superior technology might renege on an exclusive contract with a
local licensee by transferring technology to other local firms whereas the licensee
might ‘‘cheat’’ by introducing a marginal improvement in the technology. Fosfuri
3and Motta (1999) and Siotis (1999) analyze the decision between exporting and
FDI, but they simply assume that when two firm locate in the same region a
proportion of their know-how spills over to each other. This ‘‘black box’’ type of
spillovers is quite familiar in the R&D literature (e.g., d’Aspremont and Jac-
quemin, 1988).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model,
analyzes the equilibrium outcomes and discusses the results obtained. Section 3
concludes the paper.
2. The model
A multinational enterprise (MNE) has some payoff relevant information which
can be thought of as a new technology, a new production process, a new
managerial technique, or a new organizational form. We will call this information
‘‘technology’’. The technology has been accumulated prior to the game and it is
exogenously given in our model. It has not yet been introduced to the foreign
market on which we focus.
The MNE can either serve the foreign market through exports or establish a
local subsidiary (i.e. do FDI).We disregard uninteresting cases where selling in the
foreign market is not profitable FDI requires the fir to transfer its technology to
the subsidiary. We assume that such a transfer is successful only if a local worker
is well acquainted with the technology. The relevant technology can only be
transmitted through oral communication or on-the-job training.
Apart from the MNE, there also exists a local fir l which could sell the
product if it knew how the technology worked. We exclude the possibility of
licensing agreements by assuming that the costs of contracting upon this
knowledge-based asset are large enough.
The basic features of the game are described in Fig. 1.
At time T 50, the MNE decides whether to export or to do FDI. When
exporting, the fir will make use of production facilities and trained workers
located in the home country. When investing in the host market, the MNE will
have to incur a fixe cost G, which includes all the expenses associated with
operating in an unfamiliar foreign environment. The local fir does not have to
incur this cost since it is already familiar with the local market.
In addition, if FDI is chosen, the MNE sends a staff of supervisors to the
affiliat to train a local worker. After completion of the training, they return to
3 headquarters. The total cost of training the worker is F, which we set equal to zero
4 for simplicity.
The worker who receives training is hired from a pool of identical untrained
3Alternatively, a local worker is given training at the parent company.
4Qualitative results do not change with F .0; see Fosfuri et al. (1998).
4Fig. 1. The game tree.
¯ workers. She is paid the subsistence wage w which is normalized to zero. We
assume that the MNE can only write a one-period contract with the worker. We
also assume that the worker is wealth-constrained and that she cannot borrow on
the financia market, so that her first-perio wage must be non-negative. We
discuss these assumptions in more detail at the end of this section.
After having received proper training, the local worker (henceforth we shall
refer to her as the ‘‘trained’’ worker) has acquired all the necessary expertise,
technology and information to produce the good. At period T 51, production takes
place, the good is sold and first-perio profit are realized. The MNE is a
monopolist in the market in the firs period, since the local fir has no access to its
technology. N is the size of the market in period 1, as measured by the number of 1
E consumers. The MNE’s profi is N P (t) if it exports, where t is an export cost 1M
(tariff, transportation cost or wage differential). If the MNE does FDI, its profi is
E N P (gross of set up costs), with P .P (t). We set N 51 without loss of 1M M M 1
generality.
After production takes place, fir l realizes that it could also gain access to the
5technology by hiring the trained worker. The MNE would like to retain her to
avoid the dissipation of the rents associated with her technology.
We model competition for the worker in the following way. Each fir
simultaneously and independently makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the trained
worker. The fir who offers more hires the worker and pays the wage it has
offered. Put differently, the hiring process works like a first-pric auction. If both
firm offer the same wage we assume that the fir whose valuation of the worker
is highest hires her (this assumption is made to guarantee equilibrium in pure
strategies). We assume that firm have symmetric information about the value of
5 the trained worker. Also, note that we are assuming away the possibility that the
local fir might hire workers from the home country of the MNE. Therefore, no
6 spillovers can occur when the MNE chooses to export. This amounts to saying
that spillovers are localized (e.g., Audretsch and Feldman, 1996).
We shall focus on the equilibrium in which the fir whose valuation of the
7 worker is highest hires her by offering exactly the rival’s valuation. This implies
that the trained worker will appropriate some of the rents created by the
technology.
Each firm’ valuation of the worker depends on its outside options. We assume
that fir l can only acquire the technology by hiring the worker (imitation is ruled
out in our model). Hence, the local fir will make zero profit in the second
period if it does not succeed in attracting the worker. If the MNE loses the trained
worker, it will redeploy the staff from the headquarters to train another local
worker.
After the MNE has decided between exports and FDI, production takes place
and the second-period payoffs are realized. For simplicity, we assume a discount
factor of 1. We denote by N the second-period market size. If the MNE keeps the 2
trained worker, its second period payoff is given by N P (gross of the wage paid 2M
E to the worker), while it is N P (t) if it exports. 2M
For expositional reasons, we focus firs on the case where the MNE does not
export in the last period of the game. This is the case if the following holds:
Assumption A1.
E N (P 2P (t)) $G. 2M M
5In Fosfuri et al. (1998) we deal with the case of asymmetric information about the value of the
trained worker, and show that our results are not sensitive to this change.
6It seems reasonable to assume that it is more difficul for the local fir to identify trained workers if
they are in another country, and/or to attract such workers from abroad if identified
7We disregard equilibria where both firm offer a wage between the lowest and the highest valuation
of the worker (and where the fir with the highest valuation hires her), since in these equilibria the fir
with the lowest valuation is playing a weakly dominated strategy.
6Below we shall discuss briefl the case where A1 is not satisfied
If the local fir hires the trained worker and enters the market, both firm earn
gross profi N P (f) (the label D standing for ‘‘duopoly’’). The parameter 2D
f [[0,1] is an inverse measure of the degree of competition in the industry. We
assume that P (f) is differentiable and strictly increasing in f with P (0)50 D D
and P (1)5P . The degree of competition is affected by variables such as DM
product differentiation, the mode of competition (e.g., price versus quantity
competition), and competition laws and their enforcement in the local country. For
instance, with homogenous products and price competition f 50, while with
independent markets f 51.
We also assume that the local fir has to pay a fixe cost k $0 to benefi from
the technology brought in by the trained worker. The parameter k measures the
absorptive capability of the local fir and the transferability of the technology
received by the worker. If she receives general training, such as organizational,
managerial or marketing skills that can be costlessly used in other firm (and
possibly other industries), k will be very low. If instead the worker has received
training in firm-specif technology, the local fir will fin it more costly to adapt
8 this technology to its own production process, and k will be high.
We take f and k to be exogenous and do not specify any functional relationship
9 between them.
We look for the sub-game perfect equilibrium in pure strategies of the game just
described. We solve the model by backward induction.
2.1. Equilibrium solutions
As a firs step, we determine the outcome of the bidding for the trained worker.
The local firm’ valuation of the worker is v 5N P (f)2k. The MNE will earn l 2D
monopoly profi if it keeps the worker, and duopoly profi if it loses her to the
local competitor. Therefore, the MNE’s valuation of the worker is v 5N (P 2 mne 2 M
P (f)). D
Two situations are possible: either v $v , and the MNE keeps the worker by mne l
8The distinction between general and specifi on-the-job training is due to Becker (1964). In Becker,
there is specifi (general) training when workers’ productivity is lower (equal) in other firm than in the
fir which provides the training.We model this by means of a fixe cost, but the effect is the same, as
k reduces the net payoff from hiring a worker trained elsewhere.
9Parameters k and f might be related, but their relationship is not a priori obvious, as it might
depend on the nature of the technology being transferred. For instance, one might expect that the
technology received by the worker can be passed on to a rival fir more easily when the products are
similar. However, if the worker has received general training, this technology could just as easily be
transferred to firm which sell independent or complementary products as to firm which sell close
substitutes. Further, it might be more difficul to transfer knowledge to a fir which sells similar
products but has a different organizational or production structure than to a fir which sells less related
products but has a similar structure.
7paying her w 5N P (f)2k;o rv ,v , and the local fir hires the trained 2D m n e l
worker by paying her w 5N (P 2P (f)). In the firs case, the MNE pays the 2M D
local worker more than the wage in the pool, and the local economy enjoys a
pecuniary spillover. In the second case, a technological spillover occurs, since the
10 local fir manages to appropriate the MNE’s technology. The following lemma
summarizes the outcome of the hiring process.
Lemma 1. Technological spillovers never arise if:
N (P 22P (f)) 1k $0. (1) 2 MD
Proof. Spillovers do not occur if v $v . After substituting, this inequality can mne l
be written as N (P 2P (f)) $N P (f)2k. Rearranging, this gives condition 2M D 2 D
(1). h
To better interpret this result, let us introduce the following definition
Definition The ‘‘joint profit ’ effect holds (does not hold) if the sum of the gross
profit of two duopolists is smaller (larger) than or equal to the gross profi of a
monopolist.
The ‘‘joint profit ’ effect implies that P $2P (f). This is sufficien to ensure MD
that condition (1) holds and that the local fir will not hire the trained worker.
This result is reminiscent of the industrial organization literature which studies
persistence of leadership over time. Indeed, the ‘‘joint profit ’ effect, also called
the ‘‘efficiency ’ effect, has been identifie as the main condition under which a
monopolist manages to keep out potential entrants (e.g., Budd et al., 1993; Tirole,
1988).
The ‘‘joint profit ’ effect holds when the duopolists are competing fiercel
enough. Condition (1) can also be written in terms of the ‘‘competition’’ parameter
21 as f #f ;P [(P /2)1(k/2N )]. This curve is illustrated in Fig. 2. It is 1D M 2
positively sloped in (k,f)a sd f/dk 51/[2N (dP (f)/df)].0. 2D
We can now move on to the equilibrium solution of the whole game, which is
given by the following:
Proposition 1.
(i) FDI and technological spillovers. The MNE invests in the firs period and
there exist technological spillovers if condition (1) does not hold and:
E P 2P (t)$N (P 2P (f)); (2) MM 2 MD
10Notice that, in both cases, the worker benefit from a pecuniary spillover which puts her two-period
income above that earned by the workers in the pool.
8Fig. 2. The equilibrium outcome.
(ii) FDI and pecuniary spillovers. The MNE invests in the firs period but
technological spillovers do not occur if condition (1) holds and:
E P 2P (t)$N P (f)2k; (3) MM 2 D
(iii) Exports. The MNE exports in the firs period, and no spillovers arise,
otherwise.
Proof. (i) If condition (1) does not hold, technological spillovers would occur if
the MNE invested in the firs period, by Lemma 1. Therefore, the MNE’s decision
is between investing (and later losing the trained worker) and exporting in order to
avoid competition in the second period (when the MNE will invest). Investing is
E preferred to exporting if: P 2G 1N P (f)$P (t)1N P 2G, which re- M2 D M 2 M
arranged gives condition (2).
(ii) If condition (1) holds, technological spillovers do not arise in case of FDI in
the firs period. Investing is preferred to exports if: P 2G 1N P 2 M2 M
E (N P (f)2k)$P (t)1N P 2G, where N P (f)2k is the wage paid to the 2D M 2M 2D
trained worker to prevent her from moving to the local fir in the second period.
Rewritten, this inequality gives condition (3).
(iii) If neither condition (1) nor condition (2) hold, the MNE prefers to export to
prevent technological spillovers from occurring. If condition (1) holds but
condition (3) does not, the MNE prefers to export to avoid pecuniary
spillovers. h
9The equilibrium outcomes are illustrated in Fig. 2. The three loci f , f , f 123
correspond to conditions (1), (2), (3) in Proposition 1. Locus f has already been 1
21E discussed above. Condition (2) can be written as f $f ;P h(P (t)/N )1 2DM2
P [12(1/N )]j, which is independent of k. Condition (3) can be written as: M2
21E f #f ;P [(P 2P (t)/N )1(k/N )], which is positively sloped as df / 3D MM2 2 3
dk 51/N (dP (f)/df).0. Note also that we do not need to make assumptions 2D
22 on the sign of d P (f)/df , which implies that curves f and f can be convex, D1 3
concave or linear (in the graph we arbitrarily chose to draw them as being linear,
but this obviously does not affect the results we obtain). When the region with
E exports exists, i.e. [P 2P (t)]/N ,P /2, the curves f , f , f intersect at MM 2 M 1 2 3
the same point.
Let us discuss the results obtained. First, notice that technological spillovers
occur when market competition is low (f is high) and technology is easily
transferable (k is low). The role played by each variable can be easily understood
through the following thought experiments. Suppose that we are close to the
origin, so that both k and f are low. This region is characterized by easily
transferable technology but strong market competition. Strong competition implies
that the local fir gets low profit from hiring the trained worker. The MNE would
retain the worker by paying a small additional wage (pecuniary spillovers would
arise) and there is no reason to export instead of investing. Now keep k fixe but
increase f.A sf rises, competition weakens and the bid made by the local fir
increases. Accordingly, the second-period wage necessary to retain the worker
increases with f. In the region f .f .f it is cheaper for the MNE to export in 13
the firs period than to do FDI and later pay the additional wage to the trained
worker. For still higher values of f (f .f .f ), the local firm’ profi in the 21
case it hires the worker would be so high that it would outbid the MNE at the
equilibrium. In this region, however, competition is still strong enough for the
MNE to be hurt from losing its technology to a rival. Hence, the MNE exports in
the firs period to avoid dissipation of its technology. Finally, if f rises even
further (f .f ), product market competition becomes so weak that the MNE’s 2
profi would not decrease much if the local fir hired the trained worker. As a
result, at equilibrium the MNE prefers to invest in the firs period even though it
anticipates that it will lose the worker in the following period.
A similar line of reasoning clarifie the role played by the parameter k which
measures the transferability of the technology. For any given degree of product
market competition, an increase in k will lower the payoff the local fir would
obtain were it able to hire the trained worker. As a result, its bid will be lower and
the MNE will fin it cheaper to retain its worker. Hence, for any given f the
region where the MNE invests in the firs period and pecuniary spillovers occur
becomes larger.
Our results imply the following empirical predictions about the occurrence of
technological spillovers. First, one should expect, other things being equal, such
spillovers to occur when the multinational and the local fir are not direct
10competitors. This might mean that the local fir operates in another sector,
produces a good which is vertically related to the MNE’s production (either
upstream or downstream), or sells its products in a different geographical area than
the MNE. Of course, testing such a prediction would require very disaggregated
data, which might explain why, to our knowledge, this analysis has not yet been
undertaken. Nevertheless, Pack (1993) reports some anecdotal evidence about
trained workers who leave MNEs to start their own businesses in activities which
do not compete with the MNE’s business.
Of course, the extent to which technological spillovers occur depends on the
nature of the technology and how easily it can be transferred. It is well known
since the work of Becker (1964) that the more specifi the on-the-job training (or
the less easily transferable the technology) the lower the expected mobility of
trained workers. This effect is captured by the aforementioned results: technologi-
cal spillovers occur only if k is low enough. But k can also be interpreted as an
inverse measure of the absorptive capability of the local fir (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1989). Then, a high k — a low level of absorptive capability — reduces
the region in which technological spillovers occur. The prediction of our model is
thus consistent with the empirical findin that low levels of absorptive capability
of local firm are associated with reduced benefit from FDI (e.g., Kokko, 1994;
Borensztein et al., 1998). This might also have a cross-country implication, as one
would expect higher labor mobility and more technological spillovers in host
11 countries that are technologically advanced and have a highly skilled labor force.
Finally, a more speculative interpretation of k is as a measure of the protection
of intellectual property in the host country. Under the laws of trade secrets, the
worker is not allowed to disclose the MNE’s valuable technology to the local firm
Thus, k could be thought of as the expected fin the local fir has to pay if the
worker discloses the technology, or the expected cost if a non-compete covenant is
12 enforced. In this perspective, Lee and Mansfiel (1996) show that better general
protection of intellectual property increases the probability of multinational firm
investing in the country.
The literature on training has emphasized that one of the effects of ‘‘poaching’’
workers who have been trained elsewhere is to reduce the benefi of training itself,
which in turn leads to underinvestment in training. In our model, poaching might
lead the fir to export in the firs period. The effect is similar, as the export choice
involves no training of local workers. Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) point out that,
11The fact that Aitken et al. (1997) fin some (indirect) evidence of labor turnover in the US but not
in Mexico and Venezuela might be consistent with this implication of our analysis. See also
Borensztein et al. (1998).
12A non-compete covenant specifie the period of time (and the geographic area) for which the
employee cannot work for a competitor after leaving the fir (see, e.g., Budden, 1996). If a
non-compete covenant is enforced, the local fir incurs a loss since it cannot acquire the technology
immediately after the worker leaves the MNE.
11in countries where the institutional structure makes poaching more difficul
(Germany, where wages for similar workers are fixe across firm and across
regions, is a case in point), training levels will be higher than in markets where
poaching raids are not restricted. Here we have a result of the same flavor as
restrictions on labor mobility can be seen as an increase in the transferability cost
k.
2.2. Comparative statics
Figs. 3(i) and 3(ii) illustrate some simple comparative statics with respect to t
and N . In Fig. 3(i), we show the effect of an increase in transportation costs or 2
tariffs, t. Since the export strategy becomes more costly, the region where FDI
occurs at equilibrium is larger (f shifts downwards, and f shifts to the left). 23
This is due to the traditional ‘‘tariff-jumping’’ motivation for FDI and it is a
well-known outcome (see Motta, 1992). Moreover, the downward shift of f2
increases the size of the region with technological spillovers. This implies that
tariffs and similar policy instruments might be used to attract new technology into
the country. According to Siotis (1999), this is precisely the policy followed by the
European Commission to appropriate leading Japanese technology in the parts and
components consumer electronics industry. He reports that Japanese firm had
used only exports and avoided licensing agreements and FDI in the EU as a way to
preserve their technological edge. Since changes in quotas and tariffs were ruled
out by the EU commitment in the Uruguay Round negotiations, the European
Commission threatened to use other measures such as antidumping duties and
safeguard clauses to discourage Japanese exports, promote investments, and create
technological spillovers.
However, the result that an increase in export costs t might lead to FDI and
technological spillovers (whereas no spillovers would have arisen in the absence of
government intervention) is conditional on the change in the equilibrium outcome,
13 and entails an important discontinuity. If the government were not able to predict
the outcome of the game with sufficien precision, it might choose a tariff rate
which is not high enough for the MNE to switch to FDI. The effect of the tariff
might then be detrimental, due to lower consumer surplus. Therefore, strong
informational requirements are needed to ensure that a government can intervene
to improve welfare.
Fig. 3(ii) illustrates how the equilibrium outcome changes when the second-
period market size expands. At equilibrium, a higher value of N enlarges the 2
region where exports occur, but its overall effect on technological spillovers is
ambiguous. To see why, note that an increase in N produces the following effects. 2
13See Horstmann and Markusen (1992) for similar discontinuities in equilibria in a model that
analyzes the choice between FDI and exports.
12Fig. 3. (i) The effect of an increase in t; (ii) the effect of an increase in N . 2
First, the fixe cost k becomes less important relative to profit (which increase in
N ), implying that the local fir offers a higher wage to the trained worker. Hence, 2
technological spillovers occur for a larger subset of the parameter space given that
the MNE invests in the firs period (the slope of f decreases). Furthermore, in 1
order to keep the worker the MNE has to pay a higher wage. This makes FDI less
13attractive and the MNE chooses to export even if technological spillovers would
not have resulted (the curve f shifts downwards and becomes flatte ). Finally, a 3
larger N implies that competition in the second period would dissipate a larger 2
(absolute) value of duopoly profits so that the MNE has a stronger incentive to
choose costly exports in the firs period (f moves up). This reduces the possibility 2
of technological spillovers.
The analysis leads to the somewhat unexpected implication that exports might
be chosen initially in fast growing markets to avoid technology diffusion. There
exists some evidence that exports are chosen in the early periods of foreign
activity. Admittedly, though, there are probably other stories which explain this
evolution better, such as the desire to know a market well before committing
important resources (Horstmann and Markusen, 1996). Nevertheless, our results
suggest that the attempt to keep technological potential intact might also play a
role in certain circumstances.
2.3. Relaxing Assumption A1
A discussion of the effect of market size growth would be incomplete without
reminding the reader that we have so far analyzed equilibrium outcomes under A1,
which assumes that exports are never profitabl in the second period. It would be
14 easy to show that relaxing this assumption would not modify our conclusions
much with respect to the roles played by the parameters k, f and t.
However, the effect of an increase in N is worth mentioning because some 2
15 non-monotonicities in the export versus FDI decision might appear. This effect
16 is illustrated in Fig. 4. For simplicity, we draw the equilibrium outcome in the
E (N ,f) plane, for the case of G 2(P 2P (t)) .k. Along the dashed horizontal 2M M
lines in the figur (that is, for given degrees of product competition), the decisions
about involvement in the foreign market can have a reversal as the second-period
market grows. When market size is small, the optimal strategy for the MNE is to
export in both periods. At intermediate levels of N , the MNE find it optimal to 2
invest in the firs period because of the usual market size effect (as size grows, the
fixe cost of FDI decreases relative to profit ). But for large second-period
markets, the relative importance of second-period profit is very high, and the
MNE exports to avoid (technological or pecuniary) spillovers.
14However, in order for the analysis to have some interest we do assume that the MNE would always
E do FDI in the absence of spillovers, i.e. (11N )(P 2P (t)) .0. 2M M
15We are grateful to a referee for pointing out this possibility.
16 E Note that the functions f , f , f change in the region where N [P 2P (t)],G. 123 2 M M
14Fig. 4. Non-monotonicities in N . 2
2.4. Different contractual arrangements
So far we have assumed that the worker is wealth and credit constrained and
only one-period contracts can be written. The two assumptions are crucial for our
results, and exports would never occur if either of them were relaxed.
If contracts are complete, there exist several contractual arrangements that allow
the MNE to enjoy all the rents accruing to its superior technology. One such
arrangement is a two-period employment contract with the worker. A two-period
contract rules out the possible mobility of the trained worker in the second period,
and the trained worker is hired at the subsistence wage (w 50). This contract
trivially eliminates all technological and pecuniary spillovers.
However, when the sum of the duopoly profit (net of k) is higher than the
monopoly profits the aggregate rents are maximized when the worker leaves for
the local firm It is therefore optimal to include a clause in the contract sketched
above that specifie a penalty that has to be paid by the worker if the contract is
broken. By setting the penalty equal to Maxh(P (f)2k),(P 2P (f))j, tech- DM D
nological spillovers happen precisely when they maximize the aggregate rents.
Furthermore, the penalty allows the MNE to extract all rents in the industry. Under
the assumptions made, FDI is always the first-perio internationalization strategy
and the existence of technological spillovers is driven by inequality (1).
15If the trained worker is not wealth constrained (for instance, because she can ask
for a bank loan), the MNE anticipates her second-period extra wage and therefore
asks for a negative first-perio wage [either w 52(P (f)2k) if she will stay at D
the subsidiary or w 52(P 2P (f)) if she will move to a local firm] This MD
ensures that the aggregate rents are maximized and that all rents are captured by
the MNE.
3. Summary and conclusions
Spillovers have often been treated as a ‘‘black box’’ mechanism, where their
nature is left unspecified This paper provides a specifi mechanism through which
technology might involuntarily move from a fir towards others located in the
same country. Therefore, the paper offers a rationale to the empirical literature
which has uncovered the importance of localized spillovers (e.g., Audretsch and
Feldman, 1996).
We have presented a model where technological spillovers from FDI might
occur due to workers’ mobility. A MNE can transfer a superior technology to its
foreign affiliat only after having trained a local worker. Once trained, this worker
can later be hired by a local fir and technological spillovers might occur. Even
when such spillovers do not take place, the host country’s welfare might improve
because of the wage that the trained worker receives from the MNE to prevent her
from moving to a local firm
We have also shown that, in some circumstances, the MNE might prefer to
export rather than to invest, precisely to avoid diffusion of superior technology to
the local rival and/or the payment of rents to the trained worker.
Our model helps to identify the conditions under which a MNE retains the
trained worker, and those under which she leaves to a local firm The results are
consistent with the industrial organization literature on persistence of monopolies.
Technological spillovers arise (the monopoly ceases to exist) when the ‘‘joint-
profit ’ effect does not hold, that is, when industry profit are higher if both firm
can use the technology. This is more likely to happen when the local fir and the
MNE do not compete fiercel in the product market (or sell in independent or
vertically related markets), when on-the-job training is general rather than specific
and when the absorptive capability of the local fir is high. We have accordingly
identifie some empirical predictions to which our model gives rise.
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